The Canada-European Union alliance announced in Montreal on Friday is described, in the summit’s own language, as an open coalition, and that word, open, may be its most important feature. An alliance that others can join is different from a bilateral deal between two partners, because it creates a standard that other countries can adopt, and a test that its founders must pass: whether anyone actually wants to join.
Prime Minister Mark Carney, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa announced the Alliance for the Future in Montreal, with closer cooperation on defence, technology, trade and economic resilience. The alliance is described as an open coalition of like-minded nations, a phrase that invites other democracies to sign up, without specifying, yet, what signing up would require. That vagueness is deliberate: it allows the founders to claim momentum, while leaving the hard questions about obligations, costs and decision making for later.
Canada’s commitment to contribute to a 90 billion euro support loan for Ukraine is the alliance’s most concrete test of seriousness, because it involves real money for a real war, not just a statement of values. A coalition that can mobilise finance for Ukraine is a coalition that can be taken seriously by allies and adversaries alike. A coalition that cannot, or that promises finance it does not deliver, will be read as a marketing exercise, which is exactly what Carney denied it was, telling reporters that above all, this is about sovereignty, and that the alliance is not a marketing exercise.
What joining would mean
For a country considering joining, the alliance offers access to a network, not a treaty. That network includes defence cooperation, technology partnerships, trade facilitation and economic resilience measures, as well as the digital trade agreement and critical minerals financing announced alongside it. Joining would mean aligning, to some degree, with European standards and Canadian practice, and accepting that alignment as a cost of access. For smaller democracies, that cost may be worth paying, if it brings security, investment and a seat at a table where larger powers set the rules.
For Canada and the EU, the benefit of an open coalition is scale. A partnership of two is vulnerable to pressure from a larger neighbour, as Canada has learned from its trade dispute with the United States. A partnership of many is harder to pressure, because its members can support each other, share costs and present a common front. That logic, sometimes called strength in numbers, is the strategic argument behind the alliance, and it will be tested by whether other countries, watching from the sidelines, decide that joining is safer than staying out.
The 2027 test
The alliance’s definition is supposed to be settled by the 2027 summit, when the phrase ever closer association, which replaced the stronger associate membership language in September, is to be defined. By then, the founders will need to answer the questions they have postponed: what does a member commit to, what does a member receive, and who decides when the alliance acts? If those answers are clear, and if other countries have joined, the Montreal summit will be remembered as the founding of a coalition. If they are not, it will be remembered as a summit that produced a slogan, and a timetable for defining it.
Openness, in other words, is both the alliance’s promise and its risk. A coalition that is open to all like-minded nations can grow, but it can also dilute, if members join without committing, or if the founders cannot agree on what commitment means. The next two years will show which of those futures Montreal created.
